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PLATO’S THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC DECLINE
Brenner M. Fissell1
Abstract: While democracy is derided for a variety of reasons in Plato’s thought, his
most damning critique of that regime type does not involve an observation about
democracy qua democracy, but of the transition that it so easily engenders: the decline
to tyranny. Regimes are composed of individuals and groups, though, and Plato is
anxious to ascribe culpability for the degradation. Two actors are the primary focus of
his analysis — the political leaders and the !"#$%. At times he emphasizes the puissance of the !"#$%, but in other passages he suggests it is the leaders who are most
authoritative. This paper discusses these apparently contradictory passages, and works
towards a reconciliation. It argues that neither is assigned sole culpability, as both
work in complex synergy, and that the underlying cause of the decline — and the motivator behind both actors — is not simply freedom, but greed for material wealth.

I
Introduction
A cherished element of Athenian democratic ideology was the doctrine of collective wisdom.2 Large groups were believed to be inherently wiser than individuals. Nevertheless, there were instances when the !"#$%, after a period of
reflection, came to regret an earlier choice. How could the reality of fallibility
square with a faith in collective wisdom? This tension was usually resolved by
creating a scapegoat.3 The danger, it was thought, came from outside the people — from nefarious elites who, through deception, led the virtuous people
astray and turned government towards private ends.4 One can call this the
public manipulability argument.5 An alternative position involved the rejection
of collective wisdom altogether, and the belief that masses of people in fact
make decisions less virtuously or wisely.
1 Georgetown University, 37th and O Streets, NW, Washington DC 20057, USA.
Email: brenner.fissell@gmail.com
2 J. Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens (Princeton, 1989), p. 163; J. Ober,
‘The Orators’, in The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, ed.
C. Rowe and M. Schofield, pp. 130–41 (Cambridge, 2000), p. 135.
3 Cf. Ober, ‘Orators’, p. 136.
4 This is most famously stated by Aristotle in Politics 1281a–1282b. Aristotle, ‘Politics’, in Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. R. McKeon, trans. B. Jowett (New York, 2001). It
may be inappropriate to say that leaders were external to Athenian democracy, though, as
they were necessary for decision-making. Cf. M.I. Finley, ‘Athenian Demagogues’, Past
and Present, 21 (1962), p. 19. Finley calls them a ‘structural element’.
5 Cf. J. Ober, ‘How to Criticize Democracy’, in Athenian Political Thought and the
Reconstruction of American Democracy, ed. J.P. Euben, J. Wallach and J. Ober (Ithaca,
1994), p. 157: distrust of elite orators was historically a part of democratic ideology in
Athens.
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While the relationship between the people and their political leaders was a
common topic for ancient Greek intellectuals, there was in no way a consensus on the issue. In the Iliad, Homer depicts the Argive army enthusiastically
following the exhortations of whatever leader it last listened to, flip-flopping
between different courses of action.6 Similarly, the Theban herald in Euripides’ Suppliants launches into an attack on democratic decision-making, arguing that orators ‘puff up’ the people with ‘specious words’.7 The historian
Thucydides seems to agree that leaders acted somewhat freely, writing that
the noble Pericles exercised ‘independent control over the multitude’ and that
his more unscrupulous successor, Cleon, was also ‘most powerful with the
commons’.8 These were not the only points of view, though, and others argued
that it was the !"#$% that held sway. The ‘Old Oligarch’ of Athens portrays
the ignorant poor of the city ruling by the strength of their numbers, blaming
leaders whenever they make a m.9 Herodotus’s character Megabyzos, in the
‘Constitutional Debate’ of his Histories, states that a ‘worthless crowd . . .
pushes on matters with violent impulse and without understanding’.10 Finally,
in his comedy Knights, Aristophanes attacks demagogues like Cleon, but also
vacillates on the nature of the !"#$%.11 As we can see, amongst the intellectuals there was no ‘party line’ on this issue.
It is no surprise, then, that Plato weighs in on this important question. His
critique of democracy contains many different strains,12 but an important part
of his argument deals with discerning the pernicious nature of the relationship
between the people and their political leaders. Take, for example, the image of
the Ship in Republic Book VI. Here, it seems quite clear who is the active
power in a democracy, and who will prove to be its worst enemy: ‘And sometimes, if [the sailors] don’t succeed in persuading [the Shipowner], they
6

Homer, Iliad, trans. R. Lattimore (Chicago, 1963), II.110–470.
Euripides, Suppliants, trans. E.P. Coleridge (Studio City, CA, 1999), 410–412.
8 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, ed. P.J. Rhodes, trans. M. Hammond (Oxford,
2009), III.36, II.65.
9 Pseudo-Xenophon, The Constitution of Athens, trans. G. Bowerstock (Cambridge,
MA, 1968), §§1.1, 1.5, 2.17.
10 Herodotus, Histories, trans. G. Rawlinson (Ware, 1996), III.81.
11 Aristophanes, Knights, trans. A.H. Sommerstein (Warminster, 1981). I say that
Aristophanes ‘vacillates’ because of some apparently contradictory passages. Compare
lines 1120–30 with 1356–60. In the end, though, Demos is redeemed by becoming like
the Athens of old (1320–25).
12 There is a large body of scholarship arguing that Plato is more sympathetic to
democracy than is generally thought. See M. Schofield, Plato: Political Philosophy
(Oxford, 2006), pp. 61–2; J.P. Euben, ‘Reading Democracy: “Socratic” Dialogues and
the Political Education of Democratic Citizens’, in Demokratia, ed. J. Ober and
C. Hedrick (Princeton, 1996), p. 329; G. Vlastos, ‘The Historical Socrates and Athenian
Democracy’, Political Theory, 11 (1983), pp. 495–516. For a general overview of the
contours of this debate see A. Saxonhouse, Athenian Democracy: Modern Mythmakers
and Ancient Theorists (South Bend, IN, 1996), p. 87.
7
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execute the ones who do succeed . . . and then, having stupefied their noble
shipowner with drugs, wine, or in some other way, they rule the ship, using up
what’s in it and sailing while feasting and drinking’ (488c).13 The sailors, representing the politician-leaders, render the shipowner (!"#$%) helpless, and
exploit the situation for their private pleasure. What is most striking about this
passage is Plato’s description of the !"#$%. Yes, it is described first as ‘hard of
hearing’ and ‘a bit short-sighted’, but these physical defects pale when compared to the moral qualifier that follows: the !"#$% is noble (488b)! Here, it
seems as if Plato is an apologist for collective wisdom, upholding the public
manipulability thesis so popular during his day.
However, the other famous image of democracy used in the Republic — the
Beast — paints an altogether different picture: ‘It’s as if someone were learning the moods and appetites of a huge, strong beast that he’s rearing — how to
approach and handle it, when it is most difficult to deal with or most gentle
and what makes it so, what sounds it utters in either condition, and what
sounds soothe or anger it’ (493a–b). Here, the !"#$% is a terrifyingly powerful force — something to be respected because of its strength. All the cues
come from the beast; the student does not learn to alter the beast’s preferences
or behaviour, but simply to appeal to its existing nature. The student conforms, and the beast remains unchanged.14
Two Platonic images (both in the same book of the Republic) appear to
present opposite understandings of the relationship between the people and
their leaders, with a different actor dominant in each. The goal of this article is
to explore Plato’s thought on the issue, reading the Republic alongside
Gorgias.15 Along the way, we will find that the apparent contradictions do not
end with these two images, and are present throughout both dialogues. By
looking closely at what Plato said, though, we can make some suggestions as
to how to approach the disparity. Our first question, then, is one of power. Who
has it in a democracy, according to Plato? Given that he is a thoroughgoing
critic of the regime type, though, an additional question emerges: Who is culpable for democracy’s inevitable failings?
13 All Plato passages are taken from J.M. Cooper’s Hackett compilation of Plato’s
complete works: Plato: Complete Works, ed. J.M. Cooper (Indianapolis, 1997). For the
rest of the article, citations will simply note the dialogue and the Stephanus pagination
number.
14 Cf. J. Ober, Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: Intellectual Critics of Popular
Rule (Princeton, 1998), p. 236. The leader has himself undergone ‘a sort of Pavlovian
behavioral conditioning’, but yet he ‘claims to have mastered . . . the secrets of beast
management’.
15 This article deliberately confines itself to Plato’s earlier dialogues, focusing on
Gorgias and Republic, so as to avoid becoming embroiled in the developmentalist question. For more discussions of this debate, see T. Samaras, Plato on Democracy (New
York, 2002), p. 1; M. Lane, ‘Socrates and Plato: An Introduction’, in Cambridge History,
ed. Rowe and Schofield, p. 156; Schofield, Plato, p. 60.
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Most Plato scholarship has underemphasized the nuance with which Plato
makes his conclusion. Building on strong passages from Gorgias, commentators often prematurely assume that his theory clearly posits !"#$% as master
of affairs, and see the question as easily answered.16 They have failed to read
these alongside clear statements to the contrary in the Republic. No attempt
has been made to grapple with the disparity between two forcefully asserted
propositions in the Platonic corpus: the demotic power thesis (typified by the
Beast image) and the pernicious leader thesis (as seen in the Ship image). It is
tempting, but inaccurate, to paint this simplistic picture: the demos controls
affairs, and it is corrupted by its excessive lust for freedom.
Unlike earlier commentators, I argue that Plato’s theory of democratic
decline does not heap blame solely on the people, granting them the only efficacy in the polis. Instead, a relation of complex synergy between people and
leader is what results in the degradation to tyranny. Moreover, I depart from
past scholarship that has too readily understood the cause of the actors’ depravity to be their desire for freedom.17 Book VIII of the Republic surely supports
such a proposition, but I believe that it also hints at another motivation, and one
16 See B. Rosenstock, ‘Athena’s Cloak: Plato’s Critique of Democracy in the Republic’, Political Theory, 22 (1994), p. 383. It is the democrats’ desire to be ruled only by
themselves, Rosenstock posits, that allows the tyrant to take power. Cf. R. Wardy, The
Birth of Rhetoric (London and New York, 1996), p. 72: ‘only the readiness of the ignorant
“crowd” to be amused by the equally ignorant blandishments of rhetorical logos assures
rhetorical success’; Ober, Political Dissent, p. 202: ‘Callicles’ attack on philosophy confirms what the reader should already suspect: . . . He is blinded by his socialization . . .’.
These observations are often buttressed by the historical context of Plato’s Athens. See
Ober, ‘Orators’, p. 140: Historically, the orator had power, but he was really the ‘creature
and servant of the !"#$%’. Cf. Ober, Political Dissent, p. 190. Ober again argues that,
historically, the !"#$% was truly in control, and used ‘ideological hegemony’ as its ‘instrument’. Cf. Ober, Mass and Elite, pp. 168, 316, 321. The ideal orator was expected to
be a ‘mouthpiece of unspoken mass will’.
17 See Schofield, Plato, p. 120. Plato’s project in Book VIII, Schofield argues, is to
demonstrate the consequences of ‘the elevation of freedom to supreme good’. Cf.
K. Morgan, ‘The Tyranny of the Audience in Plato and Isocrates’, in Popular Tyranny,
ed. K. Morgan (Austin, TX, 2003), p. 199. The tyrant pursues the ‘illusion of freedom’. Cf. K. Raaflaub, ‘Stick and Glue: The Function of Tyranny in Fifth-Century
Athenian Democracy’, in Popular Tyranny, ed. Morgan, p. 77. The views of Polus,
Callicles and Thrasymachus represent the tyrant as the ‘freest and happiest man in the
world’. See also M.H. Hansen, ‘Democratic Freedom and the Concept of Freedom in
Plato and Aristotle’, Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies, 50 (2010), pp. 2–7, p. 23.
Hansen notes that Plato’s focus is on criticizing the freedom of ‘living as you like’.
Again, this seems to make sense based on historical context. Cf. R. Wallace, ‘Law, Freedom, and the Concept of Citizens’ Rights in Democratic Athens’, in Demokratia, pp.
105–9: ‘The ideology of freedom was central to Athenian democracy.’ This consisted of
‘living as you like’, but other elements included frank speech, the equal right to speak,
and equality before the law. Also see J. Hesk, Democracy and Deception in Classical
Athens (Cambridge, 2000), p. 219; Schofield, Plato, p. 66; Ober, Mass and Elite, pp.
335–6.
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which may be even stronger than abstract political or legal freedom: materialistic greed, or avarice. Thus, this article seeks to create a more robust account
of Plato’s theory of democratic decline by broadening the actors that it encompasses and highlighting that the pernicious dynamism of their relationship is
initiated and sustained by a decidedly concrete and worldly concept.
II
Power of the People
It is fitting to spend some time reviewing what many have already seen — the
passages emphasizing demotic power. The first dialogue we will look at,
Gorgias,18 seems to flit aimlessly among different themes. Upon closer inspection, unity is there.19 Oratory in Athens meant political power,20 and thus, in
the opinions of the political leaders, the power to do as you like with impunity.
The discussion about oratory, then, reflects a deeper topic: How should one
live irrespective of the question of rewards or punishments? 21 This foreshadows the challenge Glaucon makes to Socrates in Republic II,22 to which
Plato’s Socrates23 responds with the myth of the Ring of Gyges. Oratory functions in Gorgias as a real world Ring of Gyges. Because of this, it is appropriate that moral philosophy, punishment theory and the afterlife dominate the
dialogue. Through all these arguments, Socrates endeavours to prove to
Gorgias, Polus and Callicles that even if they had the ‘power’ they supposed
they had in the city, it would actually be the worst thing for them.
For our purposes, a second layer of refutation is more relevant. Socrates has
another point to make in Gorgias, which is this: political leaders do not even
have the power that they think they have. Oratory does not allow someone to
18

Cf. H. Yunis, Taming Democracy (Ithaca, 1996), p. 119. In having the discussion
take place after Pericles’ death, Plato is consciously addressing a Thucydidean narrative:
political leadership was supposed to have declined after Pericles with the rise of the
‘demagogues’. In attacking the older, famous orators, though, Plato seems to be debunking this myth. See W.R. Connor, The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens (Princeton, 1971), pp. 133–41.
19 Cf. Gorgias, ed. E.R. Dodds (Oxford, 1959), p. 3. He calls Gorgias an ‘ascending
spiral’. Perhaps ‘descending’ is more appropriate, though, as the souls of Socrates’ interlocutors get steadily darker with each substitution. Cf. T. Smith, ‘Rhetoric and the
Defence of Philosophy in Plato’s Gorgias’, Polis, 20 (2003), p. 66.
20 Cf. M.H. Hansen, Athenian Democracy in the Age of demosthenes (Oxford, 1999),
p. 12; Connor, New Politicians, p. 116.
21 Cf. Smith, ‘Rhetoric’, p. 62. The ‘great subtheme’ of Gorgias is the debate
between rival ways of life. See also Schofield, Plato, p. 66.
22 ‘I want to know what justice and injustice are and . . . I want to leave out of account
their rewards and what comes from each of them’ (Republic, 358b).
23 This article also avoids the debate surrounding the independence of Socratic views
from those of Plato, or, the ‘Socratic Problem’. When ‘Socrates’ is quoted, it is meant to
imply Plato’s Socrates. For an overview of the debate, see Lane, ‘Socrates’, p. 155.
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do whatever he likes, breaking free from conventions like Callicles’s lion cub
(484a). In fact, Socrates proves that to engage in a life of oratory is precisely
to chain one’s self to conventions (majority opinion),24 and to abandon the
true individuality of the Socratic-philosophic life, which dares to challenge
established doxai. He will show that Callicles is ‘unable to contradict’ his
beloved !"#$% (481c).25 As noted above, scholars have seen this theme in
Gorgias as strong evidence of Plato’s position on the cause of democratic
decline.26
The argument is presented most clearly when Socrates suggests a way to
achieve ‘immunity to unjust treatment and great power’ in the city without
becoming a tyrant yourself — this is to befriend the tyrant and assimilate his
character, becoming ‘a partisan of the regime in power’ (510e, 510a). ‘So, if
some young person in that city were to reflect, ‘In what way would I be able to
have great power and no one treat me unjustly?’ this, evidently, would be his
way to go: to get himself accustomed from childhood on to like and dislike the
same things as the master, and to make sure that he will be as like him as possible’ (510d). When Callicles agrees, the trap has been sprung. In a democracy, this principle has obvious implications for the political leader: ‘In that
case you should now be making yourself as much like the Athenian people as
possible if you expect to endear yourself to them and have great power in the
city . . . You mustn’t be their imitator but be naturally like them in your own
person’ (513a–b). To have any sway in a democracy, you cannot just put up a
democratic façade; you must authentically become one of the !"#$%. For Socrates, the main problem with this is that such a conversion involves unacceptable ethical consequences.27 Such a change is also problematic for Callicles,
though, because his own Weltanschauung depends upon individual freedom
from restraint, especially that of convention.28 If power’s acquisition requires
conformity to majority opinion, the lion cub can never assert himself freely
and independently. Here, Socrates shows that the !"#$% truly holds the reins,
and that orators’ pretensions to the contrary are nonsense. In a democracy, the
24 Cf. Ober, ‘Orators’, pp. 130–3: ‘. . . an important element of the special skill
(!"#$%&) taught by the rhetorician lay in making the speaker’s rhetorical goals appear to
be fully congruent with the audience’s pre-existing beliefs and preferences’.
25 Cf. E. Voegelin, ‘The Philosophy of Existence: Plato’s Gorgias’, Review of
Politics, 11 (1949), p. 29.
26 See notes 16 and 17, above.
27 ‘Our choice of this kind of civic power will cost us what we hold most dear’
(Gorgias, 513a).
28 Cf. Gorgias, 484a–b. Some scholars argue that Plato deliberately makes Callicles
an exaggerated figure so as to serve Plato’s ‘literary purposes’. See G. Klosko, ‘The
Refutation of Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias’, Greece and Rome, 31 (1984), p. 132;
B. McComiskey, ‘Disassembling Plato’s Critique of Rhetoric in the Gorgias (447a–
466a)’, Rhetoric Review, 11 (1992), p. 214.
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oratorical project — to claim the real-world Ring of Gyges — is a fool’s
errand!
Since the abstract argument is not enough to convince Callicles, Socrates
appeals to the testimony of history to prove his point.
Tell me: didn’t the people [Cimon] was serving ostracize him so that they
wouldn’t hear his voice for ten years? And didn’t they do the very same
thing to Themistocles, punishing him with exile besides? And didn’t they
vote to throw Miltiades, of Marathon fame, into the pit (516e)?29

Even the most renowned leaders end their lives in shame,30 cast out in ignominy by the always triumphant and always fickle !"#$%. By the end of
Gorgias, Plato has shattered the conceits of the aspirant leaders31 — they are
really ‘catamites’, taking pleasure in their submission.32
With this, Socrates has established that the !"#$% has power in the city, but
he has yet to show us why this is bad. Socrates waits until near the very end of
the dialogue to make this attack, and here it is personal. Callicles threatens
him again, in one of the many allusions foreshadowing the Apology. Socrates
replies by launching into a memorable image attacking the People’s Court:
‘For I’ll be judged the way a doctor would be judged by a jury of children if a
pastry chef were to bring accusations against him’, Socrates claims (521e). In
his indictment the pastry chef (the leader) will say to the children (the !"#$%),
‘Children, this man has worked many great evils on you, yes, on you . . . He
doesn’t feast you on a great variety of sweets the way I do’ (521e). The hapless
doctor, Socrates the true statesman, would be utterly defenceless in such a
situation: ‘Yes, children, I was doing all those [painful] things in the interest
of health’, he’d say, ‘[and] how big an uproar do you think such “judges”
29 Cf. Connor, New Politicians, p. 179. Were orators really ‘in control’ if they always
ended their careers in disgrace? Cf. Ober, Mass and Elite, p. 109; R. Knox, ‘So
Michievous a Beaste? The Athenian demos and Its Treatment of Its Politicians’, Greece
and Rome, 32 (1985), p. 138, pp. 148–9. Knox, after compiling a complicated statistical
matrix, discovers that these men had a ‘political casualty rate’ above fifty percent. He
calls political life in Athens a ‘minefield’.
30 In Yunis, Taming Democracy, pp. 141–4, the author wisely notes that the connection between all the figures invoked is their role in the Athenian empire’s expansion.
These men reflect Callicles’ ethical doctrines on an international level. This helps to
make sense of the condemnation of Pericles et al. Cf. J. Henderson, ‘Demos, Demagogue, Tyrant in Attic Old Comedy’, in Popular Tyranny, ed. Morgan, p. 156.
31 Cf. Morgan, ‘Tyranny’, p. 194. The historical Gorgias had argued for the power of
speech over an audience; thus, Plato’s choice to begin the dialogue with him foreshadows the upcoming Socratic inversion of his doctrine. Plato was also aware of
Gorgias’ views. See Philebus, 58b: ‘On many occasions, Socrates, I have heard Gorgias
insist that the art of persuasion is superior to all other because it enslaves all the rest. ’
32 Gorgias, 494e. Cf. Ober, Political Dissent, p. 205; Smith, ‘Rhetoric’, p. 70;
D. Stauffer, ‘Socrates and Callicles: A Reading of Plato’s Gorgias’, Review of Politics,
64 (2002), p. 642.
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would make? Wouldn’t it be a loud one’ (521e). Here, we get a clear reason for
the condemnation of demotic power; the people are likened to children, judging cases based on what is most gratifying. Earlier in the dialogue it is asserted
that tragedians, like political leaders, ‘treat the people like children’ (503a).
Here, they simply are children! While an insidious pastry chef indicts the doctor and flatters his jury, the jury itself is equally to blame, because it is by
nature childish — receptive to such flattery and closed to the reasoned arguments of the doctor. The child ‘judges’ need no prompting from the chef when
they shout down the doctor’s defence; their own defects are sufficient to condemn him.33
The dialogue’s depiction of the !"#$% as lord and master is certainly compelling, and it can also be found in the Republic. While Book VI contains the
image of the Ship, which appears to contradict such an assertion, the tenor of
the rest of the book is more in line with the opposite understanding — that of
the Beast image. The Republic supports the theory of demotic power in other
places as well. Just before the Beast passage, Plato pens one of his most damning condemnations of the Assembly and mass decision-making in general.
Socrates asks Adeimantus if he agrees with the ‘general opinion’ that sophists
corrupt the youth (492b), and goes on to claim that the true corruptors are the
many themselves (those who make up ‘general opinion’): ‘[they] are the
greatest sophists of all, since they educate most completely, turning young
and old, men and women, into precisely the kind of people they want them to
be’ (492b–c). This indoctrination takes place through the spellbinding effects
of mob mentality, in which ‘the very rocks and surroundings echo the din of
their praise or blame and double it’ (492c). When a young person witnesses
this, he will be transported by the hysteria, ultimately becoming ‘the same sort
of person as . . . the crowd’ (492d–e). This is ‘education . . . [by] the mob’
(492e). The similarity to Gorgias is striking; in the earlier dialogue, we see
that one must authentically become like the regime in power if one wants to be
powerful himself, and in the Republic it is asserted that nearly all individuals
reared in a democracy are indoctrinated with a democratic soul anyway. The
aspiring politician in Gorgias won’t have to work at his transformation — he
will be just like the crowd before he’s even an adult!
It makes sense that after this passage on the mob as true ‘sophist’ we are
presented with the Beast image, in which the supposed professional ‘sophists’
do nothing more than study the mob. In case this metaphor doesn’t pull its
argumentative weight, Plato makes his point explicitly: ‘If anyone approaches
33 In other passages in Gorgias we also see that the !"#$%’ judgment is inherently
bad. Note the political metaphor in Gorgias, 465d. See also C. Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia
Recast (Oxford, 2002), p. 7. Bobonich argues that non-philosophers, in Plato’s earlier
dialogues, are fundamentally incapable of virtue or of finding happiness. In Yunis,
Taming Democracy, p. 50, the author argues that Plato believes the masses are not ‘insane’, just stupid. However, I believe this is refuted by Republic, 496c.
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the majority to exhibit his . . . service to the city and gives them mastery over
him to any degree beyond what’s unavoidable, he’ll be under Diomedean
compulsion, as it’s called, to do the sort of thing of which they approve’
(Republic, 493d). So far, the Republic holds true to the arguments regarding
majority power put forward in Gorgias, with the one exception of the Ship
image. Political leaders are indeed the playthings of the omnipotent !"#$%.
III
Pernicious Leaders?
Given what we have already heard, it seems appropriate that most commentators have understood Plato’s theory of democratic decline to place blame
squarely in the lap of the !"#$%. Here, though, we must depart, and call attention to a whole host of text that suggests precisely the opposite. In the later
parts of the Republic, a new theme develops, and Plato seems to shift efficacy
away from the !"#$%, positing that malicious elites are the engine behind
political outcomes. He flirts quite close to the collective wisdom and manipulability thesis described earlier. ‘Then don’t you also agree that the harshness
the majority exhibits towards philosophy is caused by those outsiders who
don’t belong and who’ve burst in like a band of revellers’, Socrates asks
(500b). This seems to contradict the earlier statement following the Beast
image, in which he concludes succinctly, ‘the majority cannot be philosophic’
(494a), nor can they ‘in any way tolerate or accept the reality of the beautiful
itself’ (493e). Therefore, they will ‘inevitably disapprove’ of philosophers
(494a). Now, the majority is not limited by its very nature, but is corrupted by
‘outsider’ charlatans. The ‘band of revellers’ can be interpreted to be a reference to Alcibiades and his friends crashing the party in Symposium, upsetting
the ordered discussion of love (212d).34 Alcibiades and his cronies, who typify
the aspiring politicians of the city, are to blame for the majority’s harshness; it
is not just that large gatherings tend to ‘echo the din’ of praise and blame, but
that elites contribute to the chaos.
To see this new theme developed in its most mature form we must turn to
Book VIII of the Republic, which outlines the theoretical decline of the
kallipolis to its nadir in tyranny. If Plato’s most trenchant critique of democracy is that it facilitates such degradation, then Book VIII is ground zero for
our analysis.35 The ‘principle’ guiding Book VIII is ‘simple’: ‘the cause of
change in any constitution is civil war breaking out within the ruling group
34

Cf. Saxonhouse, Athenian Democracy, pp. 95–7.
There is debate surrounding the relationship between historical Athens and Book
VIII. See generally Ober, Political Dissent, p. 246. He believes Book VIII is Plato’s
description of Athens. For an opposing viewpoint, see A. Saxonhouse, ‘Democracy,
Equality, and '()&: A Radical View of Book 8 of Plato’s Republic’, American Political
Science Review, 92 (1998), p. 274.
35
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itself’ (545d). For our purposes, we want to know (1) who is the ruling group,
and (2) who is to blame for this civil war.
Because of the lack of structure and hierarchy in a democracy,36 political
leadership has only one qualification: the city honours him ‘if only he tells
them that he wishes the majority well’ (558b). From what we have learned in
Gorgias this is to be expected, and the leaders must kowtow to the !"#$%’
wishes. ‘It . . . praises and honours, both in public and in private, rulers who
behave like subjects and subjects who behave like rulers’, Socrates states
(562d).37 While !"#$% is by definition the ‘ruling group’ in a democracy, and
is described as ‘most powerful’, there is still, however, a ‘class of idle and
extravagant men [that] manages everything’ (565a, 564b–e).38 These are
political busybodies — political leaders who spend all their time in the
Assembly. Plato calls them the ‘dominant’ class in the democracy, saying, ‘its
fiercest members do all the talking and acting’ (564e). Later, we will see why
the ‘most powerful’ are not ‘dominant’ in this case.
It is here, it seems, in this class of political men, that Plato assigns a share of
culpability for democracy’s decline. He calls the idlers ‘the disease that developed in oligarchy and also in democracy, enslaving it’ (564b). Trouble begins
when the leaders begin to redistribute wealth, taking out big cuts for themselves in the process (565a). This angers the rich, who speak out in selfdefence, and the poor react to this by denouncing them as oligarchs. Neither
can see that it is the idle busybodies who are behind the class conflict. Each
camp becomes more and more partisan, embracing the ‘evils’ of each extreme
(565c). Division of ‘the people’ in a democracy fits exactly the principle
described above: constitutions change when the ruling group fights with
itself. Our two questions are answered: (1) the ruling group is initially everyone, but (2) the genesis of the civil war is not everyone’s fault. ‘But neither
group does these things willingly. Rather the people act as they do because
they are ignorant and are deceived by the drones’, Socrates argues, ‘and the
rich act as they do because they are driven to it by the stinging of those same
drones’ (565c). Here, the catalyst for decline is quite clearly elite, selfish politicians. This becomes more and more obvious when the ‘special champion’ of
the people arises from these leaders (565c). Like a puppet master, he uses his
sway over the Assembly to effect his evil ends and consolidate his power. It is
he who ‘dominates a docile mob’ (565e) and ‘stirs up civil wars against the
rich’ (566a). In this narrative, Plato seems to say that it is the evil machinations of a few leaders — and ultimately one tyrannical madman — that are
36 In Saxonhouse, ‘Equality’, pp. 273, 279, the author makes much of the ‘formlessness’ of a democracy.
37 Ibid., p. 279: Democratic formlessness with regard to ‘definitions’ allows for the
inversions of virtue and vice.
38 Cf. Hansen, Demosthenes, p. 267. It was a small minority that actually dominated
the speaker’s platform in the Assembly.
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able to destroy democracy by dividing the city. The people are ‘docile’, not
strong as in other depictions, and the champion seems able to control affairs.
As was noted, these passages have often been ignored by commentators, and
they paint a picture that prevents any easy diagnosis of culpability.
IV
Complex Synergy
Just as with Gorgias and its theory of demotic omnipotence, the narrative
recounted above, if read alongside the image of the Ship, might cause us to too
quickly ascribe to Plato a monotone, simple understanding of the cause of
democratic decline. I argue that he seeks to place blame not solely on one
actor, though, but sees both as acting in complex synergy in moving the
polis towards its doom.
The ascent of the tyrant recounted above cannot be read outside the context
of the section preceding it, in which the extremes of democracy are detailed.
The class of idlers, main players in the decline, are more numerous and ‘virulent’ mainly because of the ‘general permissiveness’ (563e, cf. 564d). The
‘disease’ of the idlers comes about only in a certain climate — a climate the
idlers themselves did not create. The !"#$% is the entity that has cultivated the
fertile ground from which these people arise.
I suppose that, when a democratic city, athirst for freedom, happens to get
bad cupbearers for its leaders, so that it gets drunk by drinking more than it
should of the unmixed wine of freedom, then, unless the rulers are very
pliable and provide plenty of that freedom, they are punished by the city
(562d).

The precondition for the drunkenness is the thirst. While it takes ‘bad cupbearers’ to actually serve the !"#$% its inebriating brew, it nevertheless
gulps down each new goblet presented to it. In fact, we learn that the relationship is synergic, each actor working with the other in a downward spiral.
This drunken !"#$% is quite different from the ‘noble shipowner’ who was
drugged; here it beckons for the wine and castigates those servers who are
stingy!
Beyond this more passive role, in which the !"#$% — by demanding ‘permissiveness’ — indirectly contributes to the ‘virulent disease’ of the idlers,
Plato also envisions it as an active force in the champion’s installation as
tyrant, consciously investing its champion with these extraordinary powers.
‘Now aren’t the people always in the habit of setting up one man as their special
champion, nurturing him and making him great?’ Socrates asks (562d). The
people make the tyrant what he is, slowly adding to his power as if ‘nurturing’ him.
As we have seen, while the vast majority of the passages describing the relationship between the people and their leaders in Platonic thought emphasize
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the puissance of the !"#$%, in that it controls day-to-day affairs, shapes opinions and can cashier its leaders at will,39 there are also cases in which it
appears that Plato might be contradicting himself, ascribing primary efficacy
to those political men.40 However, these passages are prefaced with reminders
not only that the people’s failings have created an environment receptive to
these men’s flattery, but also that they have been the active agents in the
tyrant’s installation. The relationship is one of complex synergy — each actor
bringing out the worst in the other, hastening democracy’s doom.
Remember that not all — or even most — political leaders become tyrants.
If we realize this, the distance between Republic VIII’s champion and the
feeble politician of Gorgias makes more sense, perhaps as a descriptive difference between two qualitatively distinct situations. At one extreme we find
a leader who is nothing more than a wistful dreamer,41 fantasizing about the
tyrannical life, but in reality living totally subservient to the !"#$%. These are
characters like Callicles and Polus who talk a big talk, but never act on it.
They toss around the idea of a lawless life, but they are merely students of ‘the
Beast’. At the opposite end of the spectrum, we find the ‘people’s champion’
in Republic VIII, Archelaus in Gorgias, and the sailors in the Ship image.
These politicians are not wistful dreamers but committed manipulators who
actually attempt and succeed at accomplishing ‘the most complete injustice’
(344a–c). The difference between these two poles is one of opportunity,
though, not motivation. All these leaders have the desire to live a lawless life
as tyrant, but only some are in circumstances in which this is appropriate or
possible to attempt.
At each end of this spectrum, the relationship between people and leader
is characterized by instrumentalization, but the victims are different. In the
case of the wistful dreamer, the leader’s intervention in political decisionmaking is nugatory and he must go along with majority will. Here, the !"#$%
uses him as its instrument, extracting from him gratifying things and dispensing with him once it is no longer amused. The examples of Pericles, Cimon
and Themistocles all show this tendency. &"#$% retains the power. In the case
of the committed manipulator, though, the leader’s intervention in politics is
at a high level and he directs things according to his will, as is evinced by the
‘people’s champion’ executing or exiling his opponent, regardless of guilt
39

Gorgias 510d, 513a–d, 465d, 516e; and Republic 492b–e, 493a–d, 565d, 569a–c.
Republic 488c, 500b, 564b–e, 565c, 565e, 566a–e; and Gorgias 481b, 503a, 516b.
It should be noted that Phaedrus implies such a power as well (see 267d), but hopes to
place enough qualifications upon rhetoric that it can be positive (see 277b–d). For an
elongated analysis, see Yunis, Taming Democracy, pp. 172–3. Phaedrus is not analysed
in this article, primarily because it lacks the explicitly political tone of Gorgias and the
Republic.
41 Cf. C. Whidden, ‘True Statesmanship as True Rhetoric in Plato’s Gorgias’, Polis,
22 (2005), p. 218. Callicles is a slave to social conventions and ‘can only fantasize’ about
being free.
40
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(Republic, 565e). In this situation, the leader uses the !"#$% as his instrument,
and does so in a very guileful way. By the time the people realize their errors,
it is too late and he has consolidated power. They are now the ‘weaker trying
to drive out the stronger’ (569a).
It is quite clear that the Ship image depicts a city that is on the cusp of this
transition, while that of the Beast shows a polis that has a long way to go.
What, then, is the catalyst of this devolution? What is the variable that initiates and sustains the city’s transformation? If the leaders’ aspirations are constant, what is the change in circumstances that opens a window of opportunity
for him to realize them, and become the committed manipulator?
V
The Role of Pleonexia in Democracy’s Decline — Beyond ‘Freedom’
Beyond emphasizing that Plato’s account of democratic decline assigns culpability to both major actors, working in tandem, I argue that what initiates
and sustains this relationship — what moves a city along the spectrum from
Beast to Ship — is a simultaneous awareness between people and leader of a
symbiotic potential. This symbiotic potential, though, is only seen as ‘beneficial’ to each party in the most depraved sense: both the leader and the people
see each other as helping to advance the goals of their materialistic greed. Yes,
the political and legal freedom to do as one likes is also a strong inducement
for both, but we cannot stop our analysis here.42 Schofield astutely notes: ‘It is
because democracy is a society governed by appetite that Plato thinks himself
entitled to assume that the exercise of social freedom will inevitably win out
in the end over respect for the framework that supports it and political freedom alike.’43 While it is crucial to understand that the people’s liberated orexis
is what ultimately causes the breakdown (and not merely freedom), Plato
seems to be at pains to suggest that this is a very specific breed of appetite.
Moreover, there is an additional conceptual move that is required; the leaders
must be included in the appetitive calculus. I believe that in Plato’s theory, the
most important cause of democracy’s degradation — in the sense that it is the
strongest motivation for both people and leader, and is the defining feature of
their relationship — is one that is less ethereal than the concept of political or
legal freedom. It is greed: the excessive, selfish desire to obtain material
wealth and property.
Preliminarily, it is worth surveying the various passages that emphasize
freedom’s role in the decline, so as to understand why it has so readily been
taken to be the primary Platonic indictment. At the outset, a mistaken conception of the Good orders and directs the lives of democratic individuals: ‘What
do you think [democracy] defines as the good? — Freedom: Surely you’d
42
43

See note 17, above.
Schofield, Plato, p. 112.
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hear a democratic city say that this is the finest thing it has’ (Republic 562c).
Everyone has ‘the license to do what he wants’, and ‘horses and donkeys are
accustomed to roam freely and proudly’ (557b, 563d). Freedom finds its
maximal limit in lawlessness: ‘And in the end, as you know, they take no
notice of the laws, whether written or unwritten, in order to avoid having any
master at all’ (563e). Positive laws as well as those of nature, the Gods and of
custom are thrown out.44 Plato tells us that this is the ‘impetuous’ origin of
tyranny: the lawlessness of extreme freedom (563e). One of the most direct
ascriptions of blame for the decline comes in the form of a paradox: ‘Doesn’t
the insatiable desire for freedom and the neglect of other things change this
constitution and put it in need of a dictatorship’ (562c). These are rather
strong statements about the primacy of freedom in Plato’s analysis of democratic decline.
Both actors appear, at first glance, to be motivated solely by this end. The
!"#$% is ‘athirst for freedom’ (562d), and bullies its leaders into providing
more and more of it, turning ultimately to lawlessness ‘in order to avoid having any master at all’ (563e). The ideology of freedom motivates; democratic
man seeks ‘the license to do what he wants . . . [and] arrange his own life in
whatever manner pleases him’ (557b). After they realize their errors, ‘the people get angry and say . . . that they didn’t father him and establish him in power
so that, when he’d become strong, they’d be enslaved to their own slave’
(569a–c). They had wanted to be free, it seems. The case of the leader looks to
be the same. Callicles’ initial speech in Gorgias is a defence of the completely
‘free’ life. The task of the excellent man, the aspiring politician, is to achieve
freedom from other people, as well as from his own internal scruples (492a).45
Thrasymachus agrees, saying, ‘injustice, if it is on a large enough scale, is
stronger, freer, and more masterly than justice’ (emphasis added) (Republic
344c). These wistful dreamers are really dreaming of the freedom to live as
they like, that of doing ‘whatever they see most fit to do’ (Gorgias, 466e). This
is why in Republic Book VIII Socrates says, ‘[the tyrant] is led to all the kinds
of lawlessness that those who are leading him call freedom’ (572e). Can we
stop here, though — are these passages enough to come to a conclusion about
why democracies fail?
To do this would be to ignore another strong current running throughout the
dialogues: the role of avarice in initiating and furthering the decline. While
the passages above seem to indicate that the leader and the people are ultimately motivated by an abstract, impudent desire to be the masters of their
own lives, it is not clear that Plato believes this to be great enough an incentive
44

Cf. Saxonhouse, ‘Equality’, p. 281. Impiety naturally follows lawlessness.
Callicles argues that one ‘ought to allow his own appetites to get as large as possible and not restrain them’. The connection between tyranny and democracy is personified by Callicles. Cf. Dodds, Gorgias, p. 13. He says that Callicles is ‘at once a product of
democracy and its deadliest enemy’. Cf. Yunis, Taming Democracy, pp. 120–2.
45
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for either party to act. In fact, it may not even be the main incentive. It is
important to acknowledge that something more basic does much of the heavy
lifting, triggering and fuelling the complex synergy described above.
To be sure, avarice looms large over Book VIII of the Republic. While still
working on the consolidation of his power, the leader ‘drops hints to the people
about the cancellation of debts and the redistribution of land’ (565e–566a).
Immediately, his first instinct is to appeal to material greed, not the promise of
political liberties. Of course, both policies, debt cancellation and redistribution, are parasitic, and what benefits the people harms the rich. It is no wonder,
then, that Plato says, ‘these rich people are called drone-fodder’ (564e). The
leader capitalizes on this parasitic potential and facilitates the consumption of
one group by the other. The adversarial relationship between the majority and
the wealthy is what he seeks to inflame: The nascent champion is called ‘the
one who stirs up civil wars against the rich’ (566a). But that which makes the
relationship between the people and the wealthy parasitic is precisely what
makes the leader–people relationship symbiotic. ‘The leaders,’ Socrates states,
‘in taking the wealth of the rich and distributing it to the people, keep the
greater part for themselves’ (565a). By acting as their agent, the leader can
simultaneously effect gains for the people and for himself. This is the epitome
of symbiotic greed — the people get some, and the leader takes even more.
There is only one victim (or at least, so it seems).
This relationship between leader and people becomes so regularized that all
of civic life is reduced to an organized, parasitic division of the spoils. Plato
writes: ‘[The poor] take no part in politics . . . but, when they are assembled,
they are the largest and most powerful class . . . but they aren’t willing to
assemble often unless they get a share of the honey’ (565a). Only greed — not
abstract political concepts — can wake them from their slumber, and each
time they do wake, they feel powerful and satisfied with the results. Whenever
they come to vote they receive more property, and thus the people slip into a
false sense of security. The tyranny-facilitating effect of this apathy cannot be
underestimated. Tellingly, it is not the lovers of political liberty or equality
that first denounce this growing threat, but the lovers of money: ‘And when a
wealthy man sees this and is charged with being an enemy of the people
because of his wealth . . . he’d be executed’ (566c). The adversaries of a political movement can reveal as much about its nature as do its adherents, and the
wealthy man’s opposition shows us the most salient feature of the new order.
Time and time again we are made to understand that avarice, not merely the
desire for freedom, is the engine behind the devolution.
When the tyrant finally does reveal himself, the people also show their true
colours. This retrospective lamentation at the new state of affairs is essential
in understanding their expectations. When they realize they have been duped,
they are angry that they are not free (569a–c), but they also reveal another
erstwhile motivation: ‘They hoped that, with him as their leader, they’d be
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free from the rich and so-called fine and good people in the city’ (569a).
Notice that this expression of regret is also a confession — they admit that
they consciously nurtured him and gave him power, and did so for avaricious
reasons. Later, when Plato discusses the newly established tyrant’s policies,
we are made to further understand the nature of their pacification: ‘won’t he
smile in welcome . . . freeing the people from debt, [and] redistributing the
land to them’ (566e). Yet again, it is by playing on the people’s greed that the
tyrant continues to gain ground — he makes good on the ‘hints’ he had
dropped earlier (565e). The process is not greased by freedom (as some legal
or political enabler of lifestyles and actions), but by greed. The people set up
the leader as their authoritatively sanctioned ‘Robin Hood’ — through his
agency their avarice can be satiated.46
Knowing the necessity of harnessing this impulse to his advantage, it is no
surprise that the new tyrant stirs up a war not merely to keep the people in
need of leadership, but ‘so that they’ll become poor . . . [and] concern themselves with their daily needs’ (566e). Before he was established, he’d consolidated his power by bringing them out of poverty. Now he’s on top, though,
and the people’s material self-sufficiency is a threat. He must reduce them to
dependence through taxation, forcing them into a state of distraction in which
their only care is subsistence. Property and wealth are the mechanisms of control both before and after he ascends.
The manipulation of greed allows for the run-of-the-mill political leader to
become the people’s champion, and ultimately the tyrant. The leader sees the
potential to ride the wave of popular support as he consolidates his power,
while the people are sated by property — almost bribed. Let us look at this a
bit closer.
In falling prey to this trick, the !"#$% commits two judgment errors: it
believes that the leader will act lawlessly on its behalf, and it flatters itself
with the conceit that it still has final say. First, these errors contribute passively, in that they provide the champion with the political leg-room to extend
his strangle-hold without opposition. The average citizen feels most strongly
the effects of those who are most near to him: the domination of his landlord
and creditor chafe more than that of any rising leader in the assembly. Because
of this, the people fail to see the secret consolidation taking place. Moreover,
the evisceration of an oppressive class seems all the better when the fruits
of its destruction are showered upon its former victims. Political apathy
naturally follows from this focus on material wealth. The !"#$% assembles
only rarely, and only to get more of the spoils. The people are so bedazzled
46 Cf. Schofield, Plato, p. 111: ‘So, before all else, given the social freedom to do as
one likes, what people in general will do under a democracy is the thing money gives
them the capacity to do — satisfy their appetites.’ See also G. Grote, Plato, and the Other
Companions of Sokrates (London, 1865), Vol. III, p. 107. Freedom gradually becomes
‘extravagance’.
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by the spectacle — the destruction of their intermediate masters and the redistribution of the ‘honey’ — that they cannot see their champion transforming himself into an even greater overlord.
This helps to explain why the judgment errors also contribute more directly
to the tyrant’s rise. The !"#$% will not merely passively facilitate his ascent
by inaction, it will vigorously aid the champion and invest him with more
authority, believing he will perpetually gratify its greed (562d). However, to
expect regularity in either intention or action is a grave misunderstanding of
what it is to be ‘lawless’.
Both actively and passively, the errors of the !"#$% create the opportunity
for the leader, welcoming his change from dreamer to manipulator. Errors (a)
and (b) are related: the greed that spawns error (a) is distracting and pervasive,
thereby engendering the nonchalance and apathy of error (b). No inquiries are
made as to the eventual outcome of the decimation of the rich; the people are
too busy drinking their fill of that class’s lifeblood to care. This naïve selfishness is why the tyrant’s installation is said to be ‘aided by the foolishness of
the people’ (575d) — a foolishness consisting of cupidity and myopia. The
political leader is able to instrumentalize the people precisely because they are
under the false impression that they are instrumentalizing him! Beyond this,
by the time he has finished his work, the tyrant has eliminated all those with
the means or the sophistication to oppose him or to launch a separate claim to
rule. After all, he must be on the lookout for these ‘brave, large-minded,
knowledgeable, or rich’ types even after he has ascended to primacy (567b–c).
Fortunately for him, most of this work is already done by then.
Avarice is obviously not limited to the people, though, and also motivates
the leaders. We have already seen that they ‘keep the greater part for themselves’ (565a) as they effect their redistributions in Republic Book VIII, but
we can find evidence of this elsewhere. In the Ship image, after the sailors
take over, ‘they rule the ship, using up what’s in it and sailing while feasting
and drinking’ (488c). It is not just political power (rule) that they sought, but
the goods in the ship’s hold. In this image, the feast and drink are the coffers of
the city, now disposable at the whims of the tyrant and his cronies.
Similarly, in Gorgias, Callicles’ world-view illustrates the material-focused
goal of the aspiring tyrant. He says, ‘it’s a just thing for the better man and the
more capable man to have a greater share’, and he believes that, according to
nature, the ‘superior rule the inferior and have a greater share’ (483d). The
‘freedom’ accompanied by ascension to autocratic political rule is accompanied by a very tangible benefit: material spoils — the ‘greater share’. Additionally, Callicles says that he yearns for a life where one is ‘free to enjoy good
things without any interference’ (492b). His goal is not a freedom for its own
sake, then, but as a facilitator of greedy pleasures. Furthermore, while he
believes the best man ought not to be enslaved to anyone, that man should also
‘allow his own appetites to get as large as possible’ (491e). Again, freedom
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from enslavement is not merely the removal of an impediment to living as he
likes, but is directly tied to his pursuit of indulgence. All aspiring tyrants
should act in furtherance of a deeper hedonic end: the Leaking Jar image is the
truest picture of human motivations (494b).47 In the discussion of the prototyrant’s soul in Republic Book IX, we come to understand more fully the
already obvious connection between hedonism and wealth.48 The prototyrannical soul indulges in ‘feasts, revelries, [and] luxuries’, but this profligate lifestyle requires pecuniary wherewithal to support it: ‘Consequently, he
must acquire wealth from every source or live in great pain and suffering’
(574a). Wealth becomes the tyrant’s obsession.
VI
Conclusion
Democracy declines because avarice perniciously alters the relationship between
the leaders and the people — avarice is the independent variable controlling
the spectrum mentioned earlier. It is not enough to say that the desire for ‘freedom’ solely (or even mostly) moves both parties, nor is it accurate to look at
either in isolation. It is both actors that make decisions guided by greed, working in complex synergy — the leader aiming to support the flow into his Leaking Jar, and the people grasping for ‘honey’ — but only one is wrong in its
long-term calculations. I believe that this account of Plato’s theory of democratic decline offers a more multi-dimensional view than that of previous
scholarship, in which culpability is assumed to be heaped upon the !"#$%,
with its primary ethical-political impetus being freedom.
It is fitting that Plato’s own contribution to the debate surrounding the
relationship between people and leader, and its political consequences,
emphasizes the primacy of an ethical idea in determining outcomes. The way
that individual and social life plays out depends upon what we are following:
knowledge or opinion. The aspiring tyrant pursues the fruits that come from
being the individual strongman, while the !"#$% seeks material satiation by
leeching off the rich.49 Plato’s accomplishment is that he moves us away
from the simplistic ‘blame game’, where democratic apologists argue for the
manipulability thesis, pointing their fingers at leaders when things go wrong.
However, he doesn’t place all culpability on the lap of the !"#$%, either, as
does the monotone narrative of the Old Oligarch.50 Instead, he suggests that
47

It is no wonder, then, that the pastry-chef orator of Gorgias ‘aim[s] at gratification’
(521e).
48 Cf. Morgan, ‘Tyranny’, p. 198: this is an example of an ‘explicitly political’ discussion of the functioning of the soul.
49 Cf. ibid., p. 199. ‘Democracy exists in complicity with tyranny, and both constitutions bestow illusionary mastery.’
50 Interestingly, the Old Oligarch also sees that freedom is connected to lawlessness,
and that this is what the !"#$% desires (Pseudo-Xenophon, Constitution, §1.8).

Copyright (c) Imprint Academic 2011
For personal use only -- not for reproduction

234

B.M. FISSELL

it is an impulse endemic to humanity, avarice, that is the engine behind
democracy’s decline, motivating both of the primary actors, who — in seeking to instrumentalize each other for their own gain — bring out the worst in
everyone, and condemn the polis.51
Brenner M. Fissell
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51 This paper was written at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge. The author thanks
M. Schofield, C. O’Siochru and M.O. Knott.
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